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Using the 2003 and 2008 Quality of Life Surveys, we identify the factors that affect housing 
tenure decisions in Colombia and explore the determinants of the demand for rentals and 
purchases. Variables affecting the choice between buying and renting include civil status, 
education, age of the household head, size of the household and whether the household 
resides in an urban area. Households with higher income are more likely to purchase than to 
rent and the choice of formal housing is positively associated to wealth. Interestingly, 
households eligible for social housing subsidies are more likely to purchase than to rent and 
those working in the informal sector are more likely to purchase informal dwellings. Demand 
is quite responsive to price changes as well as to changes in the price of rental (its closest 
substitute). The elasticity to permanent income for both buying and renting is similar to that 
observed in other developing countries, and is higher for those working in the informal 
sector. This suggests that subsidies and other interventions aimed at fostering demand should 
not exclude those holding informal sector jobs. Demand is highly responsive to positive 
shocks to income, a fact probably associated with credit constraints being binding. Subsidies 
have a large positive impact on demand. Likewise, access to mortgage credit is an important 
determinant of demand. Finally, savings have a positive effect on demand in 2008, not in 
2003. A plausible explanation is that a policy intervention that began in 2000 –i.e, a tax 
exemption for households that established savings accounts destined for housing purchases—
only had an effect in the upper part of the business cycle. In both cases (i.e. subsidies and 
credit) the positive effect on demand is entirely explained by demand for social housing. 
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Housing is an important sector in any economy and a thorough understanding of the 
determinants of housing demand is essential. An analysis of the determinants of formal and 
informal housing in developing countries is a useful instrument for the design of policy 
interventions geared at promoting welfare through the formalization of the housing market. In 
this paper this analysis is undertaken from two different perspectives: (1) the election of 
tenancy option (i.e. formal or informal purchases vs. rentals); and (2) the determinants of 
housing demand. A key element in our analysis is the potential role played by access to 
financing and by subsidies for construction and for acquisition. The paper is divided into four 
sections. The first section presents a brief review of the literature related to housing demand. 
The second describes the evolution of the housing sector in Colombia and makes a succinct 
inventory of the salient public policy decisions with regard to housing, focusing on social 
housing. The third section presents the econometric estimations related to housing tenure and 
housing demand. The fourth section concludes and provides some policy recommendations.  
 
1  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There is a vast literature regarding the determinants of housing tenure choice in developed 
countries. In general, these studies do not analyze the informal dimension of housing, as in 
these countries the choice is to a great extent limited to buying or renting formal dwellings. In 
developing countries there are, in addition to formal alternatives, different informal ones: (i) 
there is the option of buying property in an illegal housing project, in which a promoter sells 
dwellings located in zones in which housing developments are not allowed; (ii) there are 
owner-build houses in a land that has been illegally taken over and in which development 
norms are not followed (Cocatto, 1996 and Dowall, 2006). In many instances these 
arrangements are explained by people being displaced from rural areas and by local 
goverments’s inability to promote and control the supply of urban land (Dowall, 2006). 
Unsurprisingly, the main finding of studies on housing demand in developing countries is that 
demand for informal housing is more prevalent among low-income households.
2  
  Several studies on the determinants of housing demand are based on the framework 
advanced by Rosen (1979), Gillingham &  Hageman (1983) and Goodman (1988). In the case 
                                                 
2  See Jacobs and Savedoff (1999) and McCann and Koizumi (2006) for the case of Panama and Morais and 
Cruz (2007) for the case of Brazil.    3 
 
of the decision to purchase, these studies highlight the need to analyze the decision to buy or 
lease, jointly with the decision on how much to spend, in case the purchase is the chosen 
option
3. The joint estimation allows for the identification of the price-elasticity of demand. 
Goodman´s (1988) methodological proposal has been applied by Cadena et al. (2010) to the 
housing market in Guayaquil and by Fontela & Gonzalez (2009) to the case of Mexico.  
Colombia´s housing sector has been the focus of several studies, most focusing on 
housing finance. Murcia (2007) finds that the probability of having a mortgage is higher for 
households in urban areas, for those receiving a government subsidy and for those in the 
highest quintile of the income distribution. Rocha et al. (2006) analyze barriers to accessing 
credit by poor households, Cuéllar (2006) focuses on how regulatory aspects have affected 
financing of low-income housing, while Silva (2007) assesses the impact of public policy 
aimed at enhancing credit for low-income housing. There is only scant literature identifying 
the determinants of housing demand and supply. Clavijo et al. (2005) and Arbeláez (2006) 
use macro-level data. The first paper undertakes an econometric analysis of the short-term 
determinants of supply and demand for 1991-2004 and reports evidence that housing demand 
is elastic to the price of new houses, to the real rate of interest and to income. Along the same 
lines, Arbeláez (2006) estimates supply and demand for 1997-2003 and finds that the amount 
of credit, the real rate of interest, labor income and unemployment are all determinants of 
housing demand. Using micro level data, Ingram (1984) finds that demand in Bogota and 
Cali is positively related to household size. For renters he finds an income elasticity of 0.47 
and a price elasticity of -0.48 for Cali and of 0.72 and -0.28 for Bogota. For owners he reports 
higher income elasticities (0.76 in Cali and 0.78 in Bogotá), and a lower price elasticity for 
Bogota. Assadi and Ondrich (1993) use a simultaneous model of housing demand, location 
and labor supply for the same cities. They find that the income elasticity of demand is 0.56.  
  
2  THE HOUSING SECTOR IN COLOMBIA 
 
This section is divided into two parts. In the first one we characterize Colombia´s housing 
market; we describe the evolution of construction activity, real estate prices and social 
housing finance. In the second we focus on regulatory issues including norms governing the 
rental market and on public policy aimed at promoting demand, particularly among the poor.  
 
                                                 
3 This framework is based on the notion that if one only takes into account the amount of expenditure 
undertaken, without due consideration to the choice between housing alternatives, OLS estimates will be biased 
if, indeed, the two decisions are undertaken simultaneously.   4 
 
2.1  Characterization of Colombia´s housing market 
 
Housing activity, particularly social housing, has gone through a slump in the last two 
decades. This helps explain an important qualitative and quantitative deficit. The quantitative 
deficit is in the order of 1.3 million units, placing ownership indicators generally below those 
of other countries. This deficit is related both to supply considerations associated with the 
high cost of land and with demand elements, including lack of credit, a particularly prevalent 
problem in the case of social housing. All indicators of construction activity show a sharp 
decline starting in 1995. After bottoming out in 2000, activity has recovered, but by 2008 it 
had not reached the levels observed in the early 1990s. As a percentage of GDP, housing and 
other construction
4 went from 5% in 1994 to 3.4% in 2007 (Graph 1).  Sectoral GDP annual 
growth peaked at 44% in 1993; it became negative in 1995 (-4.5%) and bottomed out at -
32.2% in 1999. Growth became positive in 2000, and reached 25% in 2007.  Construction 
licenses are a relevant indicator of (intended) activity. With regard to total housing, licenses 
peaked at 12.3 million square meters in 1994. They declined to 5.5 million in 1999 and then 
recovered, reaching 13.9 million in 2007. With regard to social housing (VIS for its Spanish 
acronym), licenses reached a maximum of 3.1 million square meters in 2002. They declined 
to 2 million in 2004, and recovered to 2.9 million in 2007 (Graph 2). 
 
 
                                                 
4 Includes housing construction and other types of buildings (i.e. malls and commercial facilities) and excludes 
public infrastructure. 5 
 










The relationship between standards of living and dwelling conditions is examined via the 
quantitative and qualitative deficits. The former shows how many units are needed to achieve 
a balance between the number of households and the number of housing units. The latter is 
defined as the proportion of primary housing units with three addressable deficiencies: over-
                                                 

















































































































































6, inadequate utilities and building deficiencies. In 2005 the quantitative deficit 
was 12.4% -- i.e. 1.3 million additional units were needed in order for every household to be 
sole user of a house (Table 1). This percentage has fallen by a third since 1993. Likewise, the 
qualitative deficit has declined, from 37% in 1993 to 24% in 2005. Clearly, the housing 
deficit has more to do with the quality of housing than with household´s not owning a 
dwelling. Many households live in their own houses, but in conditions of over-crowdedness.  
According to the 2005 Census, some 80% of dwellings have basic services (electricity, water, 
sewerage), while access to services with substitutes is lower (Table 2). 
 
Table 1: Housing Deficit  
   1993  2005 
   # of households  %  # of households  % 
Total Households         7,159,825.00  100%      10,570,899.00   100% 
Total Housing Deficit         3,841,300.00  53.7%        3,828,055.41   36.2% 
Quantitative Deficit         1,217,056.00  17.0%        1,307,757.24   12.4% 
Qualitative Deficit          2,624,244.00  36.7%        2,520,298.16   23.8% 
Source: DANE Census 
 





Sewer system  73.06% 26.94%
Watter 83.41% 16.59%
Natural Gas  40.32% 59.51%
Telephone 53.40% 46.05%
Source: DANE, Censo 2005 
  
With regard to the percentage of the urban population living in informal settlements in Latin 
America, according to UN-HABITAD in 2005 Chile (9%), Costa Rica (10.9%), Paraguay 
(17.6%) and Colombia (17.9%) were the countries that fared better, with Bolivia (50.4%), 
Honduras (34.9%) and Brazil (28.9%) in the other extreme. On the other hand, in 2007 only 
half of Colombian households owned their house, a lower percentage than in many countries 
with a lower per capita GDP (Table 3). Interestingly, in Europe home-ownership is much 
higher in peripheral countries than in wealthier France, Sweden and the Netherlands. 
 
                                                 
6 Over-crowdedness is defined as five persons living in one room. 7 
 
 





Bolivia  66.4                     4,091  
Brazil  73.8                     9,854  
Colombia  50.3                     7,983  
Costa Rica  71.7                   10,451  
Honduras  72.0                     4,109  
Panama  79.1                   10,372  
Paraguay  79.7                     4,518  
Uruguay  65.9                   11,529  
Venezuela  81.4                   12,201  
United States*  68.0                   46,674  
United Kingdom*  70.0                   35,512  
Spain*  83.0                   30,186  
* Clavijo et al (2005) and ECLAC.       
     
 
We now review some facts that may explain the housing deficit. Graph 3 shows the real price 
index for new and old houses and for rentals. Prices of new houses peaked in 1997; they 
declined 63% from 1997 to 2003 and have increased 87% since. In 2008 they were back to 
their 1999 level, 76% lower than in 1997. Using the repeated sales methodology, the central 
bank constructs a used houses price index with assessments by financial institutions at the 
time of a loan approval. This index peaked in 1995; it consistently declined until 2003 and 
has recovered since. In 2009 it reached its 1995 level. Interestingly, rental prices evolved 




                                                 
7 With regard to land prices, data is only available for a shorter period and is deemed to be of lesser quality. 
Between 2003 and 2008 prices have been somewhat volatile, in all increasing by around 1.5% in real terms. 8 
 





Whit regard to credit, the ratio of mortgage loans to total financial sector loans went from 
23.8% in 1994 to over 31% in 2000; it then plummeted and stood at 7.6% in 2009 (Graph 4).   
 
Graph 4: Mortgage Loans/Total Loans 
 
Source: Financial Superintendency 
 
Disbursements by financial institutions can be divided between those financing purchases of 
new houses and those financing purchases of used houses (Graph 5). Disbursements for new 
houses went from 60% of total disbursements in 1996 to 41% in 2006, with the total amount 
































































































































































mostly by loans for purchases of new houses. Disbursements for social housing averaged 
23% of total disbursements between 2005 and 2009 (Graph 6).   
 
Graph 5: Disbursement for Purchase of New and Used Houses 
 
Source: Financial Superintendency  
 
Graph 6: Disbursement for Social and Non Social Housing 
 
Source: Financial Superintendency  
 
With respect to mortgage interest rates, these are expressed in terms of a unit of account 
indexed to inflation (UVR for its acronym in Spanish). Graph 7shows interest rates (on top of 













































































































































































declined almost continuously until 2006 and have increased since. Interestingly, rates on non-
social housing go through periods in which they are roughly equal to rates on social housing
8. 
 
Graph 7:  Interest Rates for Social and Non Social Housing 
 
Source: Financial Superintendency  
 
2.2  Housing Policy and Institutions 
 
2.2.1  Rental Housing  
 
Law 820 of 2003. The government was concerned with the results in the 2001 National 
Households Survey, according to which some 3 million families did not own any housing nor 
had enough resources to purchase one, despite the loans and subsidies granted by the 
government. This implied a failure to comply with Art. 51 of the Constitution, according to 
which all citizens must have access to decent housing. A solution that emerged was to 
eliminate the distortions in the market for urban rentals. The rule in force at the time gave 
little incentive to build housing for rental purposes, was not equitable between the parties and 
granted no warranties with respect to the reinstatement of the property to its original owners 
at the end of the contract (Castaño 2004). The main reforms introduced in 2003 were: 
                                                 
8 According to Law 546 of 1999, the interest rate for mortgage loans for social housing is capped at 11%, for 














































































  The establishment of solidarity in the leasing contract, so that obligations may be 
demanded by or met by all or any of the landlords or tenants. This implies that the 
landlord may sue the tenant in order to make him responsible for the rental fees and 
the reinstatement of the property, without the need of summoning both parties in a 
judicial process (Cuellar, 2006).    
  Elimination of solidarity from the lease contract and reinstatement of the property 
whenever the tenant fails to comply with obligations derived from utility contracts, 
provided that: (i) the landlord has previously announced the existence of the lease 
contract with the utilities company, and (ii) the tenant has requested the landlord the 
underwriting of insurance against the possible nonpayment of public services. 
  The increase in rental fees would equal 100% of registered inflation in the previous 
year, up from the 90% increase established in 1985.  
  The grounds for termination of the contract became more flexible. 
  Law 820 granted fiscal incentives to social housing renters and authorized the creation 
of Real Estate Investment Funds in order to develop the real estate business associated 
with social housing rentals.  As of yet, no fund has been established. 
 
It has been found that renters have taken advantage of loopholes in the law and have stopped 
paying rental & administration fees and public services. The latter may be a consequence of 
the troublesome and tedious legal process that landlords must endure. A study by Fedelonjas 
(2006) found that there continues to be delays in the reinstatement process, especially on the 
police inspector´s part, since a judicial order is required and this may take months or years.  
 
2.2.2  Policy Instruments to Promote Housing Demand 
 
Direct Subsidies. Public housing subsidies were created by Law 3 of 1991. Before 
implementing such policy, a large part of public resources destined towards the construction 
of housing for low income population were being wasted or were not making it to their final 
destination (Jaramillo, 2009). The whole idea behind granting demand subsidies directly to 
the users is that (i) this would create competition amongst promoters, thus reducing prices; 
and (ii) someone purchasing a house can now choose the best option according to his (her) 
needs. Direct subsidies for the purchase of housing have been managed by four institutions: 
1) Fonvivienda (formerly Inurbe); 2) Family Welfare Agencies (FWA); 3) the Military 12 
 
Housing Promotion Agency (MHPA) and; 4) the Public Agricultural Bank.  The subsidies 
granted by these institutions are financed by the National Budget and by payroll taxes.   
During 1991-2009, Fonvivienda and the FWA handed out close to 72% of all 
subsidies. Targeting the poorest households has been based on two conditions: i) applications 
for the subsidy are restricted to households earning less than 4 monthly minimum legal wages  
(mlw) or households ranked in the lowest living conditions; and ii) subsidies are assigned by 
a scoring methodology that ranks applicant households according to their saving efforts and 
socio-economic characteristics. Initially, the maximum awarded by Inurbe was set at 25 mlw 
for housing valued at less than 70 mlw, while the maximum value of the subsidy granted by 
the FWA was inversely related to household income. In regard to Fonvivienda,  Table 4 
shows that between 1997 and 2009 the maximum value of the subsidy decreased for all types 
housing, especially for those valued above 70 mlw. Since 2004 FWA´s began applying 
Fonvivienda´s methodology, the maximum value of the subsidy depending on the value of 
the house. In 2007 it was stipulated that the maximum value awarded by Fonvivienda would 
depend on the SISBEN score
9, and in the case of the FWA the maximum value would 
depends on household income. Moreover, in 2007 it was established that public entities may 




Table 4: Fonvivienda and Family Welfare Agencies (FWA) 
 Maximum Value of the Subsidy (in monthly minimum wages) 
 
Housing Prices  30‐50  50‐70  70‐100
100‐
135 
Decree 824/99  25  25  25  20 
Decree 2620/00  23  16  16  10 
Decree 1585/01  25  25  20  20 
Decree 2488/02  23  16  16  10 
Decree 
975/04 
Fonvivienda 21  14  7  1 
FWA  17  12  7  1 
Dec.1526 & 4429/05
/1 21  14  7  1 
/1 Decree 4429 of 2005 increased FWA’s maximum value of the subsidy  
to 10 mw for housing between 70 and 100 mw 
Source: Ministry of Environment, Housing and Regional Development (MAVDT), Arbeláez et al. (2010) 
 
                                                 
9 SISBEN is an indicator of households’ well-being. It serves as an instrument to target social programs. The 
index is a function of a set of variables related to the consumption of durable goods, human capital endowment 
and income. The Social Housing Subsidy is targeted to households ranked in the two lowest SISBEN levels.  
10 This does not apply to Family Welfare Agencies as they are governed by private law. 13 
 
According to the Ministry of Environment & Housing, during 1991-2009 Fonvivienda, the 
FWA and the Public Agricultural Bank granted subsidies equivalent to 0.2% of GDP; 
104.000 households per year received benefits
11. The average value of the subsidy peaked in 
1991, declined significantly in 1992, and has remained relatively stable since (Graph 8).  
 
 
Graph 8: Evolution of Subsidies 
 
Source: Ministry of Environment, Housing and Regional Development; Arbeláez et al. (2010) 
 
Programmed Saving Accounts. In 1991, when the program of subsidies for social housing 
was created, it was decided that as part of the criteria for being nominated as a possible 
beneficiary, households had to prove they had savings capacity. During 1991 and 1992 this 
criterion acted as an important entry barrier; in 1993 it was abolished for future applicants. 
Nonetheless, in 2000 the government once again stipulated that in order to apply for a 
subsidy, households must meet some requirements regarding savings. Programmed saving 
accounts were created as a means for applying households to gather, through periodic 
savings, enough resources in other to make an initial down-payment. The amount that must 
be saved during the contract period must be at least 20% of the value of the property. Via 
programmed saving accounts households are entitled to tax exemptions.   
 
                                                 




















































































































































Saving Accounts for Housing Purchase were created in 2000 as a mechanism similar to the 
subsidies granted for the acquisition of social housing, but targeted to middle and high 
income households. Through these accounts, households receive tax exemptions; they may 
transfer the amount of the tax due as a contribution to the down-payment or to the monthly 
mortgage fee. The maximum monthly savings a beneficiary may have is 30% of his (her) 
paycheck. This deposit may only be used in order to purchase housing (new or used).  
 
Interest rate subsidies. Since April 2009 this subsidy is channeled through banks, in charge 
of processing credit applications. The government pays up to 5 percentage points of the 
interest rate if the value of the house is less than $70 million
12, up to 4 p.p. if the price range 
is within $70-$120 million, and up to 3 p.p. if the price range is within $120-170 million. The 
benefits awarded will only last for the first 7 years of the loan. These measures help reduce 
the monthly fee by up to a 30%. This benefit is expected to have a higher impact on middle 
income households as low income households have access to alternative programs.  
 
 
3  HOUSING TENURE AND HOUSING DEMAND IN COLOMBIA 
  
3.1  The data 
 
We use the National Quality of Life Survey (QLS) conducted by the National Department of 
Statistics (DANE). It was conducted in 2003 and 2008; it is representative at the country 
level, regional level, Bogota level and socioeconomic stratum. It includes questions on type 
of housing and physical conditions, access to public utilities, socio-demographic variables, 
health, education, and the labor market, among others. Households self-report the estimated 
value of their housing units and the type of tenure. Housing can be (i) owned and fully paid 
when one of the household members has the ownership title and does not have housing 
financing of any kind; (ii) owned but still being paid for; (iii) rented; (iv) in usufruct, when 
the household is authorized by the owner to occupy the housing unit without paying rent; and 
(iv) de facto occupied, when a household occupies the unit without being the owner or being 
authorized. If the unit was bought during the 4 years prior to the survey, the survey asks 
questions on funding (including own resources, mortgage, credit from friends/relatives and 
severance payments). In the 2003 survey we are able to know whether the household received 
                                                 
12 In 2009 this amount represents about 140 MLWS or us$30.300. 15 
 
a subsidy. According to these surveys, one half of households own their house and around a 
third are renters. One sixth of the population lives in usufruct arrangements; although very 
few are de facto occupants, this percentage increased from 1.2% in 2003 to 3.6% in 2008. 
Note that these proportions remain quite stable between 2003 and 2008 (Table 5). 
 
 
Table 5: Tenure Type 
   2003     2008 
   Freq.   %     Freq.   % 
Owner  10,774  52.4%     6,057  46.2% 
Owing  1,202  5.8%     832  6.3% 
Renters  5,807  28.2%     4,018  30.7% 
Usufruct  2,530  12.3%     1,728  13.2% 
De facto occupant  251  1.2%     476  3.6% 
Source: 2003 and 2008QLS  
 
3.2  Definition of informal housing  
 
One purpose of this study is to explore the determinants of households’ decisions with regard 
to choosing to live in formal or informal housing. In this section we explain the definition of 
informality used throughout the paper. Usually, informal dwellings are those that comply 
with all legal requirements and urban regulations. In parallel with this, there are informal 
markets whose transaction purpose does not fit into the legal and regulatory requirements 
(Abramo, 2003). One way of capturing this concept is through the registration of dwellings; 
therefore, dwellings can be considered as formal if any member of the household has the title 
deed of the house. For owners interviewed in 2008 we know if the household has a property 
title. Using this information, we classify as informal those houses that were occupied de facto 
and those for which the owner does not have a title. Figure 1 sketches the definition. 
 
 











Unfortunately, the information on housing registration is only available in the 2008 QLS. As 
a consequence, we constructed a more elaborate definition of informality that captures 
different dimensions of the house, mainly related to its level of precariousness
13. Dowall 
(2007) suggests that informal housing can be defined according to three concepts: security of 
tenure, access to services and physical characteristics of the structures. Based on this 
definition, we built a Formal Housing Index (FHI) using information from the 2003 and 2008 
QLS, as a weighted average of: i) households´ self-reported de facto tenure; ii) access to 
public services; and iii) physical conditions of the settlement and housing units. Following 
Kolenikov & Angeles (2009) and Hamill (2009), and given that we are working with discrete 
variables, we conducted a Principal Component Analysis using tetrachoric correlations. 
In Table 6 we present the coefficients of each variable for the first principal 
component, which explained 30% of the variance of the data
14. The signs are as expected. De 
facto tenure reduces the likelihood of being formal and increases the probability of being 
informal by 23%, and all settlement risks increase informality. Adequate access to utilities 
reduces the chance of being informal by around 30%, depending on the type of service. 
Among wall materials, only bricks and prefabricated materials reduce the probability of 
informal settlements. With regard to floor materials, marble, carpet, vinyl, tiles and bricks 
reduce housing informality, whereas cement, wood and dirt increase it. 
 
  
                                                 
13 At the end of this section we show that the legal definition based on dwelling registration using data of the 
2008 QLS is highly correlated with the one we are proposing here. 
14 The optimal number of components was selected following two criteria: the eigenvalues must be greater than 
one and the optimal principal components must be located before the “elbow” of their scree plot. From the 
latter, available upon request, it is clear that the first component is optimal as the basis for the construction of a 




































Source: 2003 and 2008 QLS; authors’ calculations 
 
We considered as living in informal housing the 20% of households registering the lowest 
score on the IFI distribution. This threshold is based on the percentage of slums reported by 
UN-Habitat (17.9%) and the qualitative housing deficit
15 reported in the 2005 census 
(23.8%). Graph 9 shows the FHI distribution and the threshold, and illustrates that the 
number of households on the left side of the red line add up to 20% of our sample
16. Using 
this threshold, 17,035 households live in informal settlements, 68,112 in formal housing. 
                                                 
15 Qualitative deficit refers to the number of households living in units with inadequate physical conditions. 
16 Results were robust to sensibility checks using 15% and 30% as thresholds.  18 
 
    
Graph 9 : First Component of the Formal Housing Index  
 
Source: 2003 and 2008 QLS; authors’ calculations 
 
 
Correlation among definitions 
 
As we stated above, our definition of formality is mostly driven by the precariousness of the 
housing unit rather than by the legality of its tenancy. It is worth analyzing to what extent our 
definition overlaps with the one based purely on the legal status of the dwelling (defined by 
Figure 1).  Figure 2 shows that the overlap between these definitions is 73.8% --i.e. 73.8% of 
the houses are classified in the same category (formal or informal) by both definitions. On the 
other hand, 17.1% of households are legal tenants but live in precarious solutions, while 9.1% 
of households inhabit good quality dwellings but occupy them illegally. 
 
Figure 2: Overlap of Formality Definitions 
 
 
As stated above, the “legal” definition can only be constructed for 2008. Nonetheless, our 
definition from the FHI captures the bulk of houses considered formal/informal, according to 
its legal status. Thus, in the remainder of the paper we refer to precarious housing as 
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3.2.1  Characteristics of households  
 
Between 2003 and 2008 the number of households renting and owning informal dwellings 
both increased 4%. As a result, the participation of formal owners declined 8%. Head-of-
household formal owners tend to be married or widowed, older than 35, highly educated, 
with high income and belong to households with several members (Table 7). Head-of-
household renters are mostly single, divorced or living in cohabitation, younger (between 25 
and 49 years old), highly educated, belong to all income levels, have less household members 
and live more commonly in urban areas. Informal owners are mostly characterized by having 
low levels of education and for belonging to lower income quintiles and strata.  
  20 
 











   2003     2008 
TOTAL  32.7%  7.3%  60.1%     36.8%  11.1%  52.1% 
Gender                      
Female  30.7%  8.1%  61.2%     35.2%  7.7%  57.1% 
Male  33.5%  6.9%  59.5%     37.6%  12.6%  49.8% 
Marital Status                      
Cohabitation  42.0%  7.2%  50.8%     49.1%  13.7%  37.2% 
Married  26.8%  7.1%  66.1%     26.9%  10.2%  62.8% 
Widowed  13.5%  8.5%  78.0%     16.5%  13.7%  69.8% 
Divorced  39.6%  7.5%  52.9%     39.0%  9.2%  51.9% 
Single  42.8%  7.0%  50.2%     47.4%  5.9%  46.6% 
Age                      
12‐17 years  54.8%  3.2%  42.0%     43.2%  43.4%  13.3% 
18‐24 years  73.9%  5.0%  21.1%     68.6%  11.5%  19.9% 
25‐34 years  60.6%  6.2%  33.2%     67.1%  9.0%  23.9% 
35‐49 years  36.9%  7.3%  55.7%     40.4%  9.4%  50.1% 
50‐64 years  19.0%  7.6%  73.3%     23.6%  11.7%  64.8% 
>65  10.2%  8.2%  81.6%     11.9%  16.0%  72.1% 
Education Level                      
None/Preschool  12.6%  9.9%  77.5%     17.5%  33.8%  48.7% 
Primary (1 ‐ 5)  24.9%  9.6%  65.5%     29.5%  17.6%  53.0% 
Secondary (6 ‐ 13)  44.8%  6.4%  48.7%     46.9%  4.5%  48.6% 
Tertiary  41.0%  2.5%  56.5%     42.4%  0.9%  56.6% 
Graduate  31.2%  0.9%  67.8%     24.5%  0.4%  75.1% 
Formality                      
Informal  36.2%  8.0%  55.8%     40.4%  17.5%  42.2% 
Formal  37.8%  5.3%  56.9%     44.4%  1.6%  54.0% 
Stratum                      
0
17  24.2%  19.4%  56.5%     21.5%  73.9%  4.5% 
1  18.8%  14.5%  66.7%     26.8%  25.8%  47.3% 
2  34.5%  9.2%  56.3%     39.7%  5.1%  55.3% 
3  44.1%  2.4%  53.6%     47.5%  0.4%  52.2% 
4  35.3%  0.1%  64.6%     39.6%  0.0%  60.4% 
5  34.2%  1.1%  64.8%     23.7%  0.0%  76.3% 
6  25.1%  0.0%  74.9%     20.0%  0.0%  80.0% 
Not reported  8.3%  8.1%  83.6%     37.8%  9.5%  52.7% 
Urban                      
Rural  12.7%  7.5%  79.8%     15.4%  50.9%  33.8% 
Urban  38.3%  7.2%  54.4%     41.2%  3.0%  55.8% 
Migrant                      
No  28.1%  8.0%  63.9%     33.8%  15.8%  50.4% 
Yes  36.3%  6.7%  57.0%     39.3%  7.2%  53.5% 
Source: 2003 and 2008 QLS; authors’ calculations 
 
                                                 
17 Stratums are based on the classification for the definition of electricity rates. We define stratum 0 as houses 
with illegal connection to electricity. 21 
 
Table 8 displays the sources of funding used for housing bought between 1998 and 2002 
(2003 QLS) or between 2003 and 2007 (2008 QLS). These sources of funding are not 
mutually exclusive and percentages refer to the proportion of household who reported having 
used each source of funding, rather than the participation of the type of funding in the value 
of the house purchased. Around 80% of households used own resources in 2003, regardless 
of income. This proportion decreased to 60% in 2008. Interestingly, between 2003 and 2008 
the number of household who used housing credit decreased significantly in the higher 
quintiles and increased in the lower quintiles. The same was true for severance payments.  
  
Table 8: Sources of Funds 
   2003     2008 
   Percentage of household who used each source 
Income Quintile  1  2  3  4  5    1  2  3  4  5 
Own Resources  79.9  81.2  77.1  79.8  74.0    73.3  66.8  56.9  56.5  64.0 
Housing Credit  5.8  3.2  8.9  20.4  31.2    10.2  7.6  12.8  12.4  5.0 
Credit from Friends   18.2  13.2  12.7  13.3  9.4    2.4  4.4  5.6  0.6  0.1 
Severance Payments  1.3  5.8  9.6  19.2  26.8    4.5  8.3  15.0  11.0  7.1 
Other Resources  11.1  14.0  12.8  9.6  13.0    0.7  4.1  9.1  10.6  7.7 
Source: 2003 QLS and authors’ calculations 
 
 
3.3  Tenure choice 
 
The purpose of this exercise is to identify the variables behind households’ decisions whether 
to own or rent, and whether to live in an informal or a formal settlement. Since very few 
households rent informal dwellings, we estimate a multinomial logistic regression in which 
households can choose to rent, own informally or own formally. The decision depends on 
socioeconomic and other exogenous characteristics. Policy can also play a role: households 
ranking in the lowest living conditions (0 to 2 according to SISBEN classification) or with 
incomes below four minimum wages can apply for Social Housing Subsidies. Among eligible 
households, only those who decide to buy their dwelling receive the subsidy, while there is 
no subsidy for those who rent. The general specification is as follows:  
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where    is a vector of exogenous household characteristics which includes household head’s 
characteristics such as gender, marital status, age, education level, migration and employment 
status
18, and other household characteristics such as income, geographical location, number 
of household members, a wealth proxy calculated as a composite index of variables showing 
the possession of durable goods (washing machines, refrigerators, stoves, computers, vehicles  
and blenders) and whether the household lives in urban or rural areas.  
Table 9 reports the relative risk ratios of the probabilities for every combination of 
owning formally, owing informally or renting
19. Each panel of the table refers to a dimension 
of the tenure choice. Dimensions considered are the household head’s socio-demographic 
characteristics (Panel A), human capital and wealth (B), employment status (C) and other 
relevant variables (D). The main results can be summarized as follows: 
 
Household head’s socio-demographic characteristics. Household head’s gender, marital 
status and age have an impact on the choice of tenure. Males rent or purchase informal 
dwellings more frequently than females.  For individuals who live or used to live as a couple 
(i.e. married/cohabitation and widowed/divorced) the probability of renting is higher than that 
of purchasing
20.  Finally, older heads of households are more prone to buy housing (formal 
and informal) than to rent, and purchased houses tend to be more formal. 
    
  
                                                 
18 Household heads can be inactive, unemployed or employed. If she or he is employed she can be formal if she 
is affiliated with a pension fund and has a work contract; otherwise she is informal. 
19 The relative risk ratio (RRR) of a coefficient indicates how the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison 
group compared to the risk of the outcome falling in the referent group changes with the variable in question.  A 
RRR > 1 indicates that the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group relative to the risk of the 
outcome falling in the referent group increases as the variable increases.   In other words, the comparison 
outcome is more likely.  A RRR < 1 indicates that the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group 
relative to the risk of the outcome falling in the referent group decreases as the variable increases.  
20 The omitted category of the marital status is “single”.  23 
 
Table 9: Tenure Choice 




Male     Married/Cohabitation    Widowed/Divorced     Age 
   2003  2008     2003  2008    2003  2008     2003  2008 
2 to 1  0.914  1.200     0.662***  1.028    0.620***  1.161     1.059***  1.055*** 
   (0.100)  (0.138)     (0.098)  (0.161)    (0.090)  (0.189)     (0.003)  (0.003) 
3 to 1  0.901*  0.895     0.744***  0.701***    0.720***  0.670***     1.070***  1.067*** 
   (0.049)  (0.065)     (0.052)  (0.067)    (0.051)  (0.065)     (0.002)  (0.002) 
1 to 2  1.094  0.834     1.510***  0.972    1.613***  0.862     0.944***  0.948*** 
   (0.119)  (0.096)     (0.224)  (0.153)    (0.234)  (0.140)     (0.003)  (0.003) 
3 to 2  0.986  0.746***     1.123  0.681***    1.161  0.577***     1.011***  1.011*** 
   (0.103)  (0.080)     (0.162)  (0.101)    (0.163)  (0.088)     (0.003)  (0.003) 
1 to 3  1.110*  1.117     1.344***  1.427***    1.389***  1.493***     0.934***  0.938*** 
   (0.061)  (0.081)     (0.095)  (0.136)    (0.097)  (0.145)     (0.002)  (0.002) 
2 to 3  1.015  1.341***     0.890  1.468***    0.861  1.733***     0.989***  0.989*** 
   (0.106)  (0.143)     (0.128)  (0.218)    (0.121)  (0.265)     (0.003)  (0.003) 




Human capital and wealth. Educated individuals are more prone to rent a house; however, 
when they purchase, the likelihood of buying a formal dwelling is higher than of buying an 
informal one. On the contrary, households with higher income have a higher probability of 
buying a house than of renting it, and tend to buy formal dwellings. Finally, as expected, the 
probability of purchasing a house by more wealthy households (measured by the possession 
of assets) is by far higher than renting.    
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   2003  2008    2003  2008    2003  2008 
2 to 1  0.934***  0.916***    1.116**  1.085    2.532***  0.488*** 
   (0.010)  (0.012)    (0.054)  (0.054)    (0.225)  (0.039) 
3 to 1  0.972***  0.959***    1.400***  1.271***    2.238***  2.102*** 
   (0.005)  (0.007)    (0.037)  (0.046)    (0.103)  (0.118) 
1 to 2  1.070***  1.092***    0.896**  0.922    0.395***  2.049*** 
   (0.012)  (0.014)    (0.043)  (0.046)    (0.035)  (0.165) 
3 to 2  1.040***  1.046***    1.254***  1.172***    0.884  4.306*** 
   (0.011)  (0.013)    (0.057)  (0.052)    (0.074)  (0.321) 
1 to 3  1.029***  1.043***    0.714***  0.787***    0.447***  0.476*** 
   (0.006)  (0.008)    (0.019)  (0.029)    (0.021)  (0.027) 
2 to 3  0.961***  0.956***    0.797***  0.853***    1.132  0.232*** 
   (0.010)  (0.012)    (0.036)  (0.038)    (0.095)  (0.017) 




Employment status: Informal employees have a higher probability of owning informal 
dwellings vis á vis formal employees.
21 This probability is statistically higher than that of 
renting and buying formally. Unemployment does not seem to have an impact on tenure 
decision; we do not observe significant differences in tenure choice between employed and 
unemployed. Finally, inactive household heads are more frequently owners (formal or 
informal) than formal workers.  
  
                                                 
21 The omitted category is unemployment. 25 
 




Informal Worker    Unemployed    Inactive 
   2003  2008    2003  2008    2003  2008 
2 to 1  0.829*  1.745***    1.281  1.388    1.330**  2.089*** 
   (0.087)  (0.273)    (0.241)  (0.377)    (0.180)  (0.394) 
3 to 1  0.750***  0.853**    1.258**  1.201    1.326***  1.426*** 
   (0.036)  (0.058)    (0.117)  (0.172)    (0.091)  (0.137) 
1 to 2  1.207*  0.573***    0.781  0.721    0.752**  0.479*** 
   (0.126)  (0.090)    (0.147)  (0.196)    (0.102)  (0.090) 
3 to 2  0.905  0.489***    0.982  0.865    0.997  0.683** 
   (0.093)  (0.074)    (0.179)  (0.226)    (0.127)  (0.121) 
1 to 3  1.333***  1.172**    0.795**  0.833    0.754***  0.701*** 
   (0.063)  (0.079)    (0.074)  (0.119)    (0.052)  (0.067) 
2 to 3  1.105  2.045***    1.018  1.156    1.003  1.465** 
   (0.113)  (0.311)    (0.186)  (0.302)    (0.128)  (0.259) 




Other relevant variables: Migrant households rent more often and there are not significant 
differences in the formality of ownership. Households living in urban areas have a much 
higher likelihood of renting. Households with large number of members are more frequently 
owners; however, it is more likely that the properties are informal. Finally, the eligibility for a 
subsidy increases the probability of buying a house, either formal or informal. The positive 
impact means that, other things equal, the proportion of households purchasing housing vis á 
vis the renters is higher among households eligible for a subsidy as compared to total 
population. It could be argued that since eligibility is highly correlated with poverty, this 
variable would be endogenous and its effect would be biased. Nonetheless, it is expected that 
poorer households are less likely to buy. Therefore, if the bias exists, the impact of the 
subsidy would be, if anything, underestimated 
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   2003  2008     2003  2008    2003  2008     2003  2008 
2 to 1  0.658***  0.587***     0.340*** 0.052***    1.150*** 1.120***     6.027***  1.353 
   (0.050)  (0.046)     (0.039)  (0.005)    (0.023)  (0.024)     (0.635)  (0.306)
3 to 1  0.694***  0.615***     0.110*** 0.497***    1.096*** 1.079***     1.707***  1.157*
   (0.028)  (0.032)     (0.009)  (0.034)    (0.014)  (0.017)     (0.084)  (0.101)
1 to 2  1.520***  1.704***     2.940*** 19.248***    0.870*** 0.893***     0.166***  0.739 
   (0.117)  (0.134)     (0.338)  (1.954)    (0.017)  (0.019)     (0.017)  (0.167)
3 to 2  1.055  1.049     0.324*** 9.557***    0.953*** 0.963**     0.283***  0.856 
   (0.077)  (0.076)     (0.032)  (0.889)    (0.017)  (0.018)     (0.029)  (0.187)
1 to 3  1.442***  1.625***     9.064*** 2.014***    0.912***  0.927***     0.586***  0.864*
   (0.058)  (0.085)     (0.711)  (0.138)    (0.011)  (0.015)     (0.029)  (0.075)
2 to 3  0.948  0.954     3.084*** 0.105***    1.049*** 1.038**     3.530***  1.169 
   (0.069)  (0.070)     (0.303)  (0.010)    (0.019)  (0.019)     (0.360)  (0.255)
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3.4  Housing demand 
 
In order to estimate housing demand we adapted a model proposed by Fontela and Gonzalez 
(2008) for the Mexican market. The general model is as follows: let             ,    ,     be 
the demand function for housing of household i in market j
22. The model specification is: 
 
                                                      (4) 
 
where     is the housing quantity demanded by household i in market j;    is the housing 
price index in market j;      is the permanent income of household i in market j;      is the 
transitory income of household i in market j;    is a vector of exogenous household 
characteristics, including the household head’s characteristics and other household 
characteristics); and      is a vector of variables related to the source of funding of the unit 
(own resources, housing credit, credit from friends/ relatives, severance payments, other 
resources. In order to say something about policy, we include subsidy and eligibility for 
subsidies in vector   , according to data availability. With information from the 2003 QLS we 
know if household   received a subsidy for the purchase or construction of a housing unit or 
plot of land during the 4 years that precede the survey. With information of both the 2003 and 
2008 QLS, we know which households are eligible for social housing subsidies (i.e.: those 
that rank in the lowest levels of SISBEN or earn less than 4 minimum wages).  
 
3.4.1  Permanent and temporary income 
 
Temporary and permanent income are key determinants of housing demand. In order to 
distinguish between the two, we assume that temporary income may be explained by a set of 
observable characteristics. The part of income not explained by these variables is assumed to 
be transitory. To estimate the permanent and transitory we use household demographic 
characteristics and control variables. The model specification is: 
 
                       (5) 
 
                                                 
22 The markets are defined according to the geographical location of the housing units. Since the QLS is 
representative only for the city of Bogotá and for a group of 8 regions, we will take those regions as markets. 
The regions are Atlantic, Eastern, Central, Pacific, Antioquia, Valle, San Andrés and Orinoquía-Amazonas.  28 
 
where X  is a vector of exogenous household head characteristics such as gender, marital 
status, age, education level and employment status (formally/informally employed, 
unemployed, inactive); and other characteristics which are geographical location and number 
of household members. Results are displayed in Table 10. 
  Surprisingly, in our sample there is no significant difference in monthly earnings 
between men and women for 2003. With that exception, all variables have the expected sign 
and are significant. As expected, income increases monotonically (with diminishing marginal 
returns) with age and with education. For instance, an average individual with tertiary 
education earns 160% more than one with no education. With regard to labor status, we find 
that informal workers earn between 35% and 40% less than formal employees, the 
unemployed around 80% less and the inactive population’s income is similar to the average 
earnings of informal employees. Finally, as expected, larger households have higher incomes.  
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3.4.2  Hedonic prices 
 
Since our objective is to estimate a housing demand and therefore to identify the effect of 
prices, we need to construct different prices for similar housing. This can be done assuming 
that the prices of houses do not depend only on their physical characteristics, but also on the 
characteristics of their environment (Fontenla and Gonzalez, 2009). Consequently, the latter 
segments the housing market. Colombia is an interesting case study given that housing 
environmental characteristics are taken into account in defining housing strata, a measure that 
is used to focus cross subsidies on public services payments. Moreover, the data we use are 
representative at strata levels, which allows us to identify each stratum in a different market 
and to estimate the price of average housing in each of these markets. Based on these prices, 
we are able to construct a measure of the quantity of housing demanded.  
 Given  that     , the quantity of housing demanded by household i in market j, is not 
observable, but that we do observe a housing unit’s value at the moment of its purchase, we 
will use a hedonic price estimation to obtain    . The hedonic price technique specifies a 
model in which the dependent variable is the housing unit’s market value and the independent 
variables are the characteristics of the housing unit and some control variables. We define the 
value of housing unit n in market j as: 
 
   
          ,   ,         ( 6 )  
 
The specification of the econometric model is: 
 
   
                         (7) 
 
where    
   is the price that household i in market j paid for the unit n at the moment of its 
purchase;    is a vector of the housing unit’s characteristics and controls for housing demand 
determinants. Housing characteristics include construction materials, number of bedrooms, 
access to utilities and amenities, geographical location, occurrence of floods, land subsidence, 
etc., and nearby risk locations such as landfills, airports, communication antennas, etc. To 
control for housing demand determinants, we include the household´s permanent and 
transitory income, the education level, age, civil status and gender of the household´s head.    
is the vector of the marginal contributions of each housing attribute to the price of the 31 
 
housing unit. This vector of parameters varies across markets for each of the housing unit 
characteristics in   . The estimated marginal contributions are presented in the Appendix. 
  Once we have estimated β 
  of implicit prices for each characteristic, we are able to 
calculate the price of an average housing unit (a unit with average characteristics). Market j 
price index    is constructed as:  
     100   
    
 ,   
    
 ,        (8) 
 
where the value of stratum 3 (j=3) index is set equal to 100. The price index is reported in 
Table 11. We also report observed market values.  
 
 
Table 11: Price Index by Stratum 
 
 
Source: QLS 2003 and 2008; authors’ calculations 
 
Self-reported values in Panel A (owners) and in Panel B (renters) reflect both the prices and 
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values move in parallel, it has to be the case that differences in values are mostly explained 
by differences in prices. In other words, house attributes are similar within each market.  
The value of the housing unit n in market j consumed by household i can be expressed 
as    
             . Therefore, the quantity of housing for each household equals the ratio 
between the housing unit value and the estimated relevant price index:  
 
      





3.4.3  Results of the housing demand estimation  
 
To estimate housing demand we followed equation (5) and the above-defined variables. We 
estimate separately the demand for home purchase and for rentals. We therefore report two 
different specifications for each year (Table 12)
23. The main results are the following: 
 
Price elasticity:  
1. Is negative and significant in all specifications.  
2. As expected, an increase in the price of the substitute increases demand. Moreover, when 
including the price of the substitute, the own-price elasticity increases (in absolute value) 
quite significantly. These estimations are within the broad ranges reported in the literature 
reviewed by Malpezzi (1999) where elasticities range from close to 0  (Follain et al, 1980) 
to -1 (Malpezzi and Mayo, 1987). To the best of our knowledge, prior studies do not 
control for the price of substitutes. As can be seen in Table 12, this can severely bias the 
results.  
3. For both renters and buyers the price elasticity increased between 2003 and 2008.  
4. In general, the demand for rental housing responds slightly less to price changes than the 
demand for purchased housing.  
 
 
                                                 
23 It is possible for formal and for informal houses markets to be perfectly segmented. In that case, one market 
could behave very differently from the other. In that case, there is merit in estimating separate demand functions 
for each of them. Nonetheless, this is not possible because of the way in which we separate housing markets; our 
different markets are socioeconomic stratums (instead of regions) and housing informality is concentrated only 
in the two lowest stratums. As a result, there are not enough informal houses in higher stratums to estimate 
separately prices for formal and informal houses. Moreover, restricting the estimation to the two lowest stratums 
would not generate enough variation in order  to accurately estimate price elasticities. 33 
 
Income elasticity:  
1. The row log (Permanent Income) shows the elasticity for non-formally working household 
heads (informal workers, unemployed or inactive workers). For these workers the income 
elasticity hovers around 0.5 and there are no significant differences between the demands 
for buying and for renting. They are close to the mid-point of the range of previous 
estimates for Colombia (Ingram, 1984; Assadian and Ondrich, 1993) and for other 
developing countries. 
2. For formal workers, the income elasticity is smaller in one to two percentage points. These 
differences are, in general, statistically significant.  
3. Demand elasticity to transitory income hovers around 0.3. This is similar to what Chou 
and Shih (1995) report for Hong-Kong, but much higher than the 0.04 reported by 
Fontenla and Gonzalez (2009) in the case of Mexico.    
4. We allow shocks to income to have an asymmetric effect. In general, demand is more 





Table 12: Housing Demand Estimation 
      2003       2008 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES  Owned Units  Rented Units    Owned Units  Rented Units 
                            
Log(Price)  ‐0.34***  ‐0.84***  ‐0.24***  ‐0.80***    ‐0.64***  ‐1.13***  ‐0.61***  ‐0.98***
   (0.052)  (0.107)  (0.069)  (0.133)    (0.068)  (0.108)  (0.092)  (0.105) 
Log(Substitute Price)     1.09***     0.31***       1.19***     0.29*** 
      (0.180)     (0.073)       (0.175)     (0.043) 
Log(Permanent 
Income) 
0.52***  0.52***  0.54***  0.53***    0.40***  0.38***  0.51***  0.50*** 
(0.048)  (0.047)  (0.040)  (0.040)    (0.075)  (0.075)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
Log(Perm. Inc)XFor. 
worker 
‐0.20***  ‐0.20***  ‐0.10**  ‐0.09**    ‐0.08  ‐0.10  ‐0.13***  ‐0.16***
(0.045)  (0.044)  (0.047)  (0.047)    (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.045)  (0.044) 
Log(Transitory Inc.>0)  0.30***  0.31***  0.35***  0.35***    0.37***  0.36***  0.29***  0.27*** 
   (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.041)  (0.041)    (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.033)  (0.032) 
Log(Transitory Inc.<0)  ‐0.22***  ‐0.22***  ‐0.11***  ‐0.11***    ‐0.14***  ‐0.14***  ‐0.13***  ‐0.12***
   (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.023)  (0.023)    (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
Age  0.01***  0.01***  0.00  0.00    0.00**  0.00*  ‐0.00  ‐0.00 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Gender  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.08**  ‐0.08**    0.03  0.03  ‐0.05  ‐0.05 
   (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.034)  (0.033)    (0.060)  (0.059)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
Education  0.01**  0.01*  ‐0.00  ‐0.00    0.01  0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.01 
   (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004)    (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Marital Status (Single omitted) 
Married/Cohabitation  ‐0.20***  ‐0.19***  ‐0.08*  ‐0.07    ‐0.16**  ‐0.15**  ‐0.03  ‐0.01 
   (0.053)  (0.052)  (0.045)  (0.045)    (0.075)  (0.074)  (0.042)  (0.041) 
Widowed/Divorced  ‐0.15***  ‐0.14***  ‐0.11**  ‐0.11**    ‐0.12  ‐0.13  ‐0.02  ‐0.01 
   (0.054)  (0.053)  (0.043)  (0.043)    (0.085)  (0.083)  (0.045)  (0.044) 
Urban  0.87***  0.86***  0.72***  0.72***    0.40***  0.36***  0.58***  0.59*** 
   (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.057)  (0.057)    (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.044) 
Social Housing  ‐0.20***  ‐0.18***  0.03  0.03    ‐0.23***  ‐0.12*  ‐0.21***  ‐0.20***
   (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.040)    (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.035)  (0.036) 
Employment Status (Formal worker omitted) 
Informal Worker  ‐2.89***  ‐2.77***  ‐1.23*  ‐1.20*    ‐1.19  ‐1.39  ‐1.75***  ‐2.13***
   (0.642)  (0.638)  (0.661)  (0.656)    (1.239)  (1.233)  (0.645)  (0.630) 
Unemployed  ‐2.59***  ‐2.48***  ‐1.05  ‐1.02    ‐0.89  ‐1.12  ‐1.47**  ‐1.85***
   (0.642)  (0.637)  (0.651)  (0.646)    (1.230)  (1.224)  (0.638)  (0.623) 
Inactive  ‐2.83***  ‐2.72***  ‐1.26*  ‐1.23*    ‐1.05  ‐1.25  ‐1.67***  ‐2.06***
   (0.647)  (0.642)  (0.666)  (0.661)    (1.248)  (1.242)  (0.646)  (0.631) 
Constant  12.86***  8.21***  3.42***  4.94***    18.58***  13.08***  9.38***  9.40*** 
   (0.911)  (1.174)  (1.086)  (1.008)    (1.569)  (1.664)  (1.233)  (1.249) 
                            
Observations  10481  10481  6648  6648    5982  5982  3125  3125 




Sources of financing: 
 
1. Questions regarding financing are only available for households who actually did buy a 
house, not for the entire sample. Therefore, selection bias issues could certainly arise. To 
account for this, in columns (1) and (2) and in (5) and (6) of Table 13 we run the same 
regression, first for the entire simple and then only for those households that do report 
sources of financing.  
2. Coefficients in columns (1) and (2), and (5) and (6) are similar, suggesting that selection 
bias is not a big issue when we restrict the sample to include only those households that 
report sources of financing.  
3. The estimation for 2003 shows that the subsidy had a positive effect on demand. In 
particular, access to the subsidy increased demand by around 22%. We cannot estimate the 
effect of access to the subsidy in 2008 as the information is not available. 
4. In order to compare the impact of credit with that of saving on the demand for housing, we 
constructed “credit” as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household used credit from the 
constructor or from a financial institution, 0 otherwise; and a dummy for “savings”, equal 
to 1 if the household used severance payments or programmed savings, 0 otherwise. The 
incidence of credit has a large effect, close to 25% for 2003 and 2008 (columns 3 and 7). 
Savings does not any impact in 2003, but has an impact similar to that observed in the case 
of credit in 2008 (columns 3 and 7).   
5. When we allow for heterogeneous effects of financing sources on social and non-social 
households (columns 4 to 8), credit does not have any impact on households non-eligible 
for subsidies. On the contrary, the impact for non-social households is quite high: on 
account of having credit, demand was 40% higher in 2003 and 60% in 2008. With respect 
to savings, we do not observe an impact in any of the two groups. In 2008 the effect of 
savings is observed only among social-housing households: although the coefficients of 
savings and the interaction are not significant, the sum of the two variables – i.e. the 
impact over social-housing households – is significant. 
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Table 13: Sources of Funding and Demand 
   Regression of the Housing Quantity 
   2003    2008 











Ln(Price)  ‐0.84***  ‐0.52**  ‐0.53**  ‐0.47**    ‐1.13***  ‐1.02***  ‐1.00***  ‐1.01*** 
   (0.107)  (0.212)  (0.222)  (0.204)    (0.108)  (0.174)  (0.176)  (0.180) 
Ln(Substitute Price)  1.09***  0.67*  0.71*  0.61*    1.19***  1.02***  0.98***  0.99*** 
   (0.180)  (0.351)  (0.371)  (0.342)    (0.175)  (0.348)  (0.353)  (0.338) 
Ln(Permanent Income)  0.52***  0.44***  0.44***  0.39***    0.38***  0.61***  0.58***  0.53*** 
   (0.047)  (0.126)  (0.129)  (0.129)    (0.075)  (0.143)  (0.143)  (0.142) 
Ln(Per. Income)*Form. 
Worker 
‐0.20***  ‐0.17  ‐0.19  ‐0.15    ‐0.10  ‐0.79***  ‐0.78***  ‐0.70*** 
(0.044)  (0.130)  (0.130)  (0.131)    (0.086)  (0.235)  (0.235)  (0.233) 
Ln(Transitory Income>0)  0.31***  0.35***  0.33***  0.31***    0.36***  0.30***  0.32***  0.29** 
   (0.038)  (0.084)  (0.086)  (0.087)    (0.060)  (0.116)  (0.115)  (0.116) 
Ln(Transitory Income<0)  ‐0.22***  ‐0.26***  ‐0.26***  ‐0.25***    ‐0.14***  ‐0.05  ‐0.05  ‐0.08 
   (0.032)  (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.095)    (0.047)  (0.087)  (0.087)  (0.084) 
Social Housing  ‐0.18***  ‐0.50***  ‐0.47***  ‐0.62***    ‐0.12*  ‐0.30**  ‐0.29**  ‐0.50*** 
   (0.041)  (0.117)  (0.120)  (0.139)    (0.066)  (0.124)  (0.125)  (0.135) 
Sources of Funding 
Subsidy        0.22*  0.21*         
Not available 
         (0.126)  (0.126)         
Credit        0.22**  ‐0.05          0.25**  ‐0.04 
         (0.097)  (0.108)          (0.106)  (0.163) 
CreditXSocial Housing           0.45**             0.64*** 
            (0.184)             (0.197) 
Savings        0.04  ‐0.03          0.24*  0.03 
         (0.078)  (0.105)          (0.132)  (0.212) 
SavingsXSocial Housing           0.15             0.37 
            (0.151)             (0.252) 
                            
Observations  10481  1156  1156  1156    5982  906  906  906 
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4  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
We have undertaken several econometric exercises to identify factors that affect housing 
tenure decisions (renting, formal ownership or informal ownership) and the demand for 
rentals and for purchases. The main results and policy implications are the following: 
(i)  Variables that affect the choice between buying and renting are civil status, education,  
age of the household head, number of members in the household and whether the 
household resides in an urban or in a rural area. Households with higher income are 
more likely to purchase than to rent and the choice of formal housing is positively 
associated with household wealth.  
(ii)  The labor market also influences tenure choice. Those working in the informal sector 
are more likely to purchase informal dwellings.  
(iii)  Interestingly, households eligible for social housing subsidies are more likely to 
purchase than to rent.  
(iv)  The demand for home buying is quite responsive to price changes as well as to changes 
in the price of rentals (its closest substitute), and the same happens in the case of the 
demand for rentals.  
(v)  The elasticity to permanent income for both buying and renting is similar to that 
observed in other developing countries, and is higher for those working in the informal 
sector. Subsidies and other policy interventions aimed at fostering demand preferably 
should not include conditions that exclude people that hold informal sector jobs.  
(vi)  On the other hand, demand is highly responsive to positive shocks to income, much 
more than in other developing countries. This finding is probably associated with the 
fact that access to credit is highly restricted and credit constraints are binding.    
(vii)  We find that subsidies have a positive (and large) impact on housing demand. 
(viii)  Likewise, access to credit (as defined above) is an important determinant of demand, 
and policies that favor credit expansion would seem to make sense. Finally, access to 
savings also has a positive effect on demand in 2008, not in 2003. A plausible 
explanation to this finding is that a policy intervention that began in 2000 –i.e, tax 
exemptions for households that established certain savings accounts destined for 
housing purchases—only had an important effect (similar, in magnitude, to the one 
already described in the case of subsidies) in the upper part of the business cycle.   
(ix)  In both cases (that is, in the case of credit and in the case of subsidies) the positive 




Abramo, P. (2003), “La teoría económica de la favela: cuatro notas sobre la localización 
residencial de los pobres y el mercado inmobiliario informal” CIUDAD Y TERRITORIO 
Estudios Territoriales, XXXV (136-137) 
 
Assadian, A. and J. Ondrich (1993), “Residential location, housing demand and labor supply 
decisions of one- and two-earner households: the case of Bogotá”, Urban Studies  30:73-86 
 
Arbeláez, M. (2006). “El Sector Hipotecario Colombiano”, mimeo, FEDESARROLLO. 
 
Cadena F., M. Chalén, M. Pazmiño and O. Mendoza (2010). “Los determinantes de la 
demanda de vivienda en las ciudades de Guayaquil, Quito y Cuenca: un análisis 
multinomial”. Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral. 
 
Chou, W.L.  and  Y.C.  Shih  (1995),  "Hong  Kong  housing  markets:  overview,  tenure  
choice,  and  housing demand",  Journal  of Real  Estate  Finance  and Economics  10:7-22. 
 
Clavijo, S, M. Janna and S. Muñoz (2005). “The Housing Market in Colombia: 
Socioeconomic and Financial Determinants”, IDB, Working Paper No. 522. 
 
Coccato, M. (1996). “Alternatives to House Ownwership: Rental and Shared Submarkets in 
Informal Settlements” Thesis, McGill University.  
 
Cuellar, M. (2006), “¿A la vivienda quien la ronda?”, Instituto Colombiano de Ahorro y 
Vivienda, Universidad Externado de Colombia, p. 363-399 
 
Dowall, D. (2006). “Brazil´s Urban Land and Housing Market: How Well Are They 
Working?”, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, UC Berkeley, WP 2006-08. 
 
Duran J. “Estudio Critico de la Ley 820 de 2003” Universidad del Rosario.  
 
Ermisch, J.F, Frindlay, J., Gibb, K. (19996). “The price elasticity of housing in Britain: issues 
of sample selection. Journal of Housing Economics 5(1), 64-86 
 
Fedelonjas (2006) “Prospectivas del sector inmobiliario, Los arrendamientos y la inversión en 
propiedad raíz” , May.  
 
Follain,  J.R., G.-C.  Lim  and B. Renaud  (1980),  "The  demand  for housing  in developing  
countries:  the  case  of Korea",  Journal  of Urban Economics  7. 
 
Fontela M. and F. Gonzalez (2009). “Housing Demand in Mexico” Journal of Housing 
Economics Vol. 18, pp 1-12. 
 
Galindo, A. and E. Lora (2005). “Foundations of Housing Finance” in IDB (ed.), Unlocking 
Credit: The Quest for Deep and Stable Bank Lending, Johns Hopkins U. Press: Baltimore. 
 
Gillingham, R. and R. Hagemann (1983). “Cross-Sectional Estimation of a Simultaneous 
Model of Tenure Choice and Housing Services Demand” Journal of Urban Economics, 12, 
1982, pp. 16-39. 39 
 
Goodman, Allen C., (1988). “An econometric model of housing price, permanent income, 
tenure choice and housing demand”, Journal of Urban Economics 23, 327–353. 
 
Hamill, M. (2009), “Income Poverty and Unsatisfied Basic Needs”, ECLA, L.949. 
 
Ingram, G. K. (1984) “Housing Demand in the Developing-Country Metropolis” Housing 
Demand in the Developing-Country Metropolis. 
 
Jacobs, M., and Savedoff, W.D (1999). “There´s more than one way to get a hose: Housing 
Strategies in Panama”, Inter-American Development Bank. 
 
Jaramillo, S. (2004), “Precios Inmobiliarios en el Mercado de Vivienda en Bogotá 1970-
2004”, Universidad de los Andes, Documento CEDE 2004-42.   
 
Kolenikov S. & G. Angeles (2009), Socioeconomic Status Measurement with Discrete Proxy 
Variables: Is Principal Component Analysis a Reliable Answer? Review of Income and 
Wealth. Vol. 55(1), pp. 128-165.  
 
Marulanda, B., M. Paredes, and Fajury, L (2006). “Evaluación de los Instrumentos de Apoyo 
a la Politica de Vivienda de Interes Social”, Marulanda Consultores. 
 
McCann, P. and Koizumi,N.(2006). “Living on a plot of land as a tenure choice: the Case of 
Panama”. Housing Economics. 
 
Malpezzi, S (1999). “Economic analysis of housing markets in developing countries and 
trasition economies. In: Mills E.S.,Cheshire, P (Eds.), Handbook of Regional and Urban 
Economics, pp. 1791-1864 [chapter 44] 
 
Malpezzi, S.  and S.K.  Mayo  (1987),  "The  demand  for  housing  in  developing   
countries",  Economic Development  and  Cultural Change  35:687-721. 
 
Morais, M. and Cruz, B. (2007). “Housing Demand, Tenure Choice and Housing Policy in 
Brazil” Mimeo. 
 
Murcia, A. (2007). “Determinantes del acceso al crédito de los hogares colombianos”, 
Borradores de Economía, Banco de la República, Documento de Trabajo No. 449. 
 
Rocha, R., F. Sánchez and J. Tovar (2007). “Informalidad del mercado de crédito para la 
vivienda de interés social”, Documento CEDE 2007-10. 
 
Rosen, H.(1979). “Housing Decisions and the U.S. Income Tax”. Journal of Public 
Economics, February, pp. 1-23. 
 
Silva, J. (2007). “Línea de redescuento de Vivienda de Interés Social”, FINDETER 
 
Sims, C., Stock J. and M. Watson (1990). “Inference in Linear Time Series Model with Unit 
Roots,” Econometrica, Vol. 58, pp. 113-44.   40 
 




VARIABLES     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5 and 6) 
                    
Formal     ‐0.102  ‐0.0160  ‐0.0105  ‐0.381  0.496** 
      (0.0791)  (0.0607)  (0.107)  (0.363)  (0.213) 
Urban     0.401***  0.152***  0.162     ‐0.638 
      (0.0692)  (0.0584)  (0.158)     (0.451) 
                    
Type Of Unit 
Apartment     0.104  0.0508  0.0120  ‐0.0749  ‐0.372** 
      (0.0879)  (0.0463)  (0.0529)  (0.133)  (0.164) 
Room(s) in tenancy     0.326*  ‐0.162  0.571***       
      (0.190)  (0.223)  (0.175)       
Room(s) in other structure     ‐0.214*  ‐0.486**  0.444*  ‐1.212***    
      (0.116)  (0.208)  (0.242)  (0.463)    
                    
Wall Materials (bricks omitted) 
Adobe     ‐0.628***  ‐0.446***  0.0544  0.594***    
      (0.120)  (0.0896)  (0.156)  (0.203)    
Wattle     ‐0.507***  ‐0.512***  ‐0.261       
      (0.0900)  (0.111)  (0.198)       
Wattle and Daub     ‐0.869***  ‐0.709***  0.409***       
      (0.128)  (0.201)  (0.147)       
Coarse Wood     ‐0.376***  ‐0.857***  ‐0.000971  0.203    
      (0.0933)  (0.165)  (0.303)  (0.229)    
Prefabricated Material     0.104  ‐0.333***  ‐0.158*  0.700***  ‐0.935** 
      (0.175)  (0.0896)  (0.0917)  (0.121)  (0.458) 
Bamboo, Cane, Another Plant  ‐0.992***  ‐1.091***          
      (0.221)  (0.397)          
Zinc, Cloth, Cardboard, Disposable Materials ‐0.250  ‐1.050***          
      (0.185)  (0.330)          
                    
Floor Materials (Parquet, Marble omitted) 
Carpet     1.044  ‐1.082  ‐0.124*  ‐0.139  ‐0.339** 
      (0.673)  (0.713)  (0.0712)  (0.123)  (0.170) 
Vinyl, Tiles, Bricks     0.279  0.0441  ‐0.0981  0.0502  ‐0.284 
      (0.233)  (0.114)  (0.0627)  (0.191)  (0.230) 
Coarse Wood, Other Plant  ‐0.180  0.133  ‐0.155  0.444*  0.921 
      (0.252)  (0.153)  (0.116)  (0.235)  (0.632) 
Cement     ‐0.306  ‐0.342***  ‐0.384***  0.788*  ‐1.026*** 
      (0.236)  (0.114)  (0.0754)  (0.475)  (0.343) 
Dirt     ‐0.631***  ‐0.488***  0.115       
      (0.242)  (0.142)  (0.146)       
                    
Type of Toilet (toilet connected to sewerage omitted) 
Toilet connected to septic tank  0.207  ‐0.106  0.494**  1.814***  ‐0.404 
      (0.190)  (0.276)  (0.234)  (0.561)  (0.247) 
Disconnected toilet     0.266  ‐0.0799  ‐0.297       
      (0.206)  (0.289)  (0.289)       41 
 
      Stratum (market) 
VARIABLES     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5 and 6) 
Latrine     ‐0.0864  ‐0.632**  ‐0.829       
      (0.198)  (0.288)  (0.519)       
Low tide     0.307  0.0856          
      (0.267)  (0.409)          
No toilet     ‐0.143  ‐0.501*  ‐0.649       
      (0.199)  (0.287)  (0.405)       
                    
Housing Utilities 
Natural gas     0.184**  0.127***  0.128***  0.113  0.325** 
      (0.0801)  (0.0483)  (0.0496)  (0.0758)  (0.156) 
Aqueduct     0.143**  0.110  0.318  0.0518  ‐1.354 
      (0.0619)  (0.0701)  (0.194)  (0.421)  (0.891) 
Sewerage     0.0504  ‐0.0579  0.170  1.734***  ‐0.966** 
      (0.183)  (0.276)  (0.247)  (0.576)  (0.429) 
Rubbish collection     0.212**  0.235***  0.243  1.977***    
      (0.105)  (0.0708)  (0.183)  (0.472)    
                    
Housing Amenities 
Garden or courtyard     ‐0.0874  0.0850**  0.120***  0.146  0.293** 
      (0.0650)  (0.0386)  (0.0458)  (0.113)  (0.139) 
Lot or plot     ‐0.131**  ‐0.0339  ‐0.173**  0.481  0.383** 
      (0.0611)  (0.0551)  (0.0880)  (0.295)  (0.161) 
Garage or parking place     ‐0.0426  0.193**  0.190***  0.0970  0.0828 
      (0.376)  (0.0960)  (0.0424)  (0.0637)  (0.119) 
Rooftop or terrace     0.0577  0.166***  0.231***  0.295***  0.375*** 
      (0.0850)  (0.0454)  (0.0527)  (0.0976)  (0.137) 
Green areas or areas of common property  0.284  0.0281  ‐0.155***  0.0907  ‐0.00465 
      (0.408)  (0.0895)  (0.0446)  (0.0865)  (0.114) 
                    
Nearby risk locations 
Factories and industries     ‐0.315**  0.0742  0.0605  ‐0.155  ‐0.169 
      (0.152)  (0.0755)  (0.0612)  (0.117)  (0.196) 
Landfill     0.112  ‐0.257*  ‐0.407**  ‐0.0881    
      (0.162)  (0.132)  (0.199)  (0.123)    
Market places or slaughterhouses  ‐0.470**  ‐0.0164  0.0230  0.217  0.217 
      (0.225)  (0.109)  (0.0650)  (0.172)  (0.372) 
Airports     0.142  ‐0.111  0.00871  0.102    
      (0.197)  (0.114)  (0.0642)  (0.0944)    
Bus terminals     0.0474  0.0408  ‐0.0721  ‐0.0141    
      (0.219)  (0.124)  (0.0891)  (0.0902)    
Sewage Pipes     0.0721  ‐0.101  ‐0.0273  ‐0.0350  ‐0.0587 
      (0.0735)  (0.0674)  (0.0500)  (0.104)  (0.141) 
Plant waste water treatment  0.204  ‐0.0409  ‐0.508**       
      (0.321)  (0.147)  (0.200)       
Oil Transport     0.528***  0.0629  0.0715  ‐0.200    
      (0.182)  (0.155)  (0.440)  (0.140)    
High tension power     0.0483  0.169**  0.146*  ‐0.0476  ‐0.610*** 
      (0.133)  (0.0812)  (0.0774)  (0.0952)  (0.213) 
                    
Household Head's Characteristics 
Gender     ‐0.135*  0.0696  0.00442  0.0208  ‐0.316 
      (0.0736)  (0.0609)  (0.0551)  (0.0965)  (0.228) 42 
 
      Stratum (market) 
VARIABLES     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5 and 6) 
Marital Status (Cohabitation is omitted) 
Married     0.205***  0.143***  0.104  0.0226  0.208 
      (0.0583)  (0.0432)  (0.0652)  (0.0811)  (0.141) 
Widowed     ‐0.0658  0.114  0.0649  0.161  0.394 
      (0.0949)  (0.0770)  (0.0945)  (0.176)  (0.305) 
Divorced     ‐0.0138  0.0656  0.0987  0.0184  ‐0.444 
      (0.104)  (0.0692)  (0.0890)  (0.126)  (0.341) 
Single     ‐0.145  0.0985  0.0231  0.00221  ‐0.461* 
      (0.125)  (0.0740)  (0.0832)  (0.104)  (0.255) 
Education (None/preschool is omitted) 
Primary (1 ‐ 5)     0.0119  0.149**  0.131*  0.0956    
      (0.0651)  (0.0593)  (0.0741)  (0.187)    
Secondary (6 ‐ 13)     0.273***  0.351***  0.260***  0.497***  ‐0.113 
      (0.0837)  (0.0688)  (0.0872)  (0.139)  (0.318) 
Tertiary (univ/technical)     0.240  0.565***  0.466***  0.536***  ‐0.113 
      (0.187)  (0.0838)  (0.0873)  (0.136)  (0.344) 
Graduate     0.414  0.741***  0.522***  0.517***  0.0532 
      (0.294)  (0.133)  (0.103)  (0.126)  (0.343) 
                    
Age     0.00716*** 0.00716*** 0.0102***  ‐0.000215  ‐0.0124** 
      (0.00193)  (0.00156)  (0.00205)  (0.00434)  (0.00512) 
Observations     1884  3622  3307  1093  575 








VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5 and 6) 
                 
Formal  ‐0.113  0.120**  0.253**  ‐0.0234  1.876*** 
   (0.0925)  (0.0563)  (0.1000)  (0.745)  (0.325) 
Urban  0.383***  0.283***  0.793***  ‐0.293    
   (0.108)  (0.0672)  (0.245)  (1.048)    
                 
Type Of Unit 
Apartment  0.149*  ‐0.0228  ‐0.0188  ‐0.0422  ‐0.387***
   (0.0799)  (0.0377)  (0.0357)  (0.0675)  (0.0843) 
Room(s) in tenancy  ‐0.125  ‐0.670***  ‐0.587***       
   (0.139)  (0.104)  (0.0939)       
Room(s) in other structure  0.107  ‐0.347***  ‐0.584***  ‐0.839  ‐1.239***
   (0.291)  (0.0818)  (0.139)  (0.576)  (0.363) 
                 
Wall Materials (bricks omitted) 
Adobe  ‐0.630*** ‐0.345***  0.168       
   (0.223)  (0.0893)  (0.230)       
Wattle  0.169  ‐0.237**  ‐0.0361       
   (0.223)  (0.103)  (0.159)       
Wattle and Daub  0.0342  ‐0.427**  ‐0.168       
   (0.313)  (0.174)  (0.296)       
Coarse Wood  ‐0.267*  ‐0.228**  ‐0.110       
   (0.154)  (0.112)  (0.197)       
Prefabricated Material  ‐0.0388  ‐0.00794  0.0544  1.992**    
   (0.279)  (0.0979)  (0.0891)  (0.782)    
Bamboo, Cane, Another Plant  ‐0.402*** ‐0.224**          
   (0.132)  (0.0886)          
Zinc, Cloth, Cardboard, Disposable 
Materials  ‐0.818**  ‐0.762**          
   (0.348)  (0.307)          
                 
Floor Materials (Parquet, Marble omitted) 
Carpet  0.244  0.131  0.117*  0.0869  ‐0.0223 
   (0.365)  (0.155)  (0.0674)  (0.0772)  (0.106) 
Vinyl, Tiles, Bricks  ‐0.157  ‐0.109  0.0159  ‐0.00385  ‐0.409***
   (0.355)  (0.122)  (0.0565)  (0.0668)  (0.128) 
Coarse Wood, Other Plant  ‐0.276  ‐0.161  ‐0.105  ‐0.259  0.705 
   (0.380)  (0.158)  (0.0942)  (0.196)  (0.498) 
Cement  ‐0.458  ‐0.327***  ‐0.389***  ‐0.291  ‐0.836***
   (0.350)  (0.127)  (0.0831)  (0.204)  (0.279) 
Dirt  ‐0.405  ‐0.701***  ‐0.158       
   (0.378)  (0.197)  (0.230)       
                 
Type of Toilet (toilet connected to sewerage omitted) 
Toilet connected to septic tank  0.392  ‐0.306  0.305***  ‐2.592***    
   (0.279)  (0.288)  (0.104)  (0.912)    
Disconnected toilet  0.919***  ‐0.153  ‐0.289       
   (0.323)  (0.277)  (0.258)       
Latrine  0.445  ‐0.623  ‐1.180***       
   (0.365)  (0.379)  (0.223)       
Low tide  0.703***  0.259          44 
 
   Stratum (market) 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5 and 6) 
   (0.226)  (0.265)          
No toilet  ‐0.0554  ‐0.866***  ‐0.158       
   (0.317)  (0.325)  (0.270)       
                 
Housing Utilities 
Natural gas  0.160*  0.113***  0.0658**  0.165***  0.116** 
   (0.0957)  (0.0403)  (0.0319)  (0.0607)  (0.0571) 
Aqueduct  ‐0.101  0.0632  ‐0.129  0.483  0.958** 
   (0.147)  (0.0987)  (0.168)  (0.424)  (0.369) 
Sewerage  0.765***  ‐0.239  0.117     ‐1.002***
   (0.254)  (0.281)  (0.173)     (0.165) 
Rubbish collection  ‐0.0285  0.455***  0.0831       
   (0.132)  (0.0785)  (0.146)       
                 
Housing Amenities 
Garden or courtyard  0.0109  0.0313  0.00768  0.121  ‐0.0657 
   (0.0824)  (0.0348)  (0.0333)  (0.0847)  (0.0754) 
Lot or plot  ‐0.0395  ‐0.191***  ‐0.0700  0.320  0.173 
   (0.122)  (0.0563)  (0.0994)  (0.240)  (0.188) 
Garage or parking place  0.664***  0.227***  0.184***  0.0898  0.238*** 
   (0.231)  (0.0710)  (0.0459)  (0.0621)  (0.0742) 
Rooftop or terrace  0.203**  0.0404  ‐0.0298  0.250**  ‐0.0310 
   (0.101)  (0.0425)  (0.0475)  (0.122)  (0.0904) 
Green areas or areas of common 
property  ‐0.622  0.142**  ‐0.0168  ‐0.0292  0.0175 
   (0.703)  (0.0722)  (0.0510)  (0.0593)  (0.0748) 
                 
Nearby risk locations 
Factories and industries  0.0405  0.0574  0.164*  ‐0.169  ‐0.334***
   (0.123)  (0.0369)  (0.0904)  (0.113)  (0.0979) 
Landfill  0.0476  0.0854  0.0260  ‐0.0577    
   (0.162)  (0.0586)  (0.0690)  (0.115)    
Market places or slaughterhouses  0.0135  ‐0.0779  ‐0.107*  ‐0.159    
   (0.179)  (0.0766)  (0.0629)  (0.137)    
Airports  0.182  0.0160  ‐0.0855  0.0774    
   (0.186)  (0.0861)  (0.130)  (0.0996)    
Bus terminals  0.0654  ‐0.00670  0.131  ‐0.0172  ‐0.609** 
   (0.0992)  (0.0621)  (0.0928)  (0.130)  (0.270) 
Sewage Pipes  ‐0.212*  0.0242  0.00705  ‐0.0534  ‐0.0808 
   (0.109)  (0.0507)  (0.0451)  (0.106)  (0.105) 
Plant waste water treatment  ‐0.460*** ‐0.420**          
   (0.150)  (0.186)          
Oil Transport  ‐0.124  ‐0.0189  1.100***       
   (0.220)  (0.261)  (0.345)       
High tension power  0.240  0.0816  0.0151  0.198  ‐0.0977 
   (0.251)  (0.112)  (0.181)  (0.180)  (0.244) 
                 
Household Head's Characteristics 
Gender  ‐0.0461  ‐0.0421  ‐0.00508  ‐0.0631  ‐0.0182 
   (0.0930)  (0.0492)  (0.0386)  (0.0832)  (0.0695) 
Marital Status (Cohabitation is omitted) 
Married  0.0649  0.0557  0.0771**  ‐0.0575  ‐0.0303 45 
 
   Stratum (market) 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5 and 6) 
   (0.0879)  (0.0374)  (0.0384)  (0.0710)  (0.0799) 
Widowed  ‐0.0705  ‐0.164  0.0431  ‐0.0327  ‐0.143 
   (0.179)  (0.103)  (0.0864)  (0.117)  (0.171) 
Divorced  ‐0.0450  ‐0.0838  ‐0.0127  ‐0.139  ‐0.0702 
   (0.107)  (0.0609)  (0.0489)  (0.131)  (0.0946) 
Single  ‐0.0784  0.0428  ‐0.0142  ‐0.219**  ‐0.103 
   (0.141)  (0.0610)  (0.0567)  (0.0872)  (0.0855) 
Education (None/preschool is omitted) 
Primary (1 ‐ 5)  0.119  0.164  0.208***  0.00671    
   (0.138)  (0.103)  (0.0759)  (0.308)    
Secondary (6 ‐ 13)  0.226  0.314***  0.306***  0.0429  0.232* 
   (0.144)  (0.105)  (0.0735)  (0.289)  (0.135) 
Tertiary (univ/technical)  0.325**  0.452***  0.380***  0.205  0.230 
   (0.164)  (0.110)  (0.0796)  (0.289)  (0.159) 
Graduate  0.688  0.335  0.366***  0.228  0.352** 
   (0.614)  (0.237)  (0.0893)  (0.289)  (0.156) 
                 
Age  0.0112*** 0.00580*** 0.00499*** 0.00517**  0.00563* 
   (0.00361)  (0.00143)  (0.00186)  (0.00219)  (0.00325)
                 
Observations  562  2500  2754  556  276 








VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5 & 6) 
                 
Formal  0.0420  0.0513  2.196**       
   (0.144)  (0.305)  (0.861)       
Urban  ‐0.0876  0.00240  ‐0.00122  ‐2.156**  0.348 
   (0.106)  (0.166)  (0.266)  (1.060)  (0.516) 
# of Bedrooms  0.161***  0.110***  0.180***  0.0807  0.204***
   (0.0252)  (0.0335)  (0.0397)  (0.0855)  (0.0576) 
Type of Unit (house is omitted)                
Apartment  0.0627  0.211**  0.130  ‐0.502*  ‐0.341** 
   (0.112)  (0.0939)  (0.134)  (0.269)  (0.165) 
Room(s) in tenancy  0.0653  ‐0.0904          
   (0.267)  (0.762)          
Room(s) in other structure  0.741**  ‐0.0250  0.992**       
   (0.364)  (0.290)  (0.412)       
Other (tent, wagon, boat, shelter, bridge)  ‐0.366  0.704  0.385***       
   (0.269)  (0.603)  (0.143)       
Wall Materials (bricks omitted)                
Adobe  ‐0.379*** 0.176  ‐1.186*  ‐0.677  1.379***
   (0.120)  (0.154)  (0.625)  (1.237)  (0.413) 
Wattle  ‐0.186  ‐0.643*** ‐0.858*       
   (0.123)  (0.207)  (0.454)       
Wattle and Daub  ‐0.624*** ‐0.733*** ‐0.475       
   (0.109)  (0.213)  (0.553)       
Coarse Wood  ‐0.478*** ‐0.521**  ‐0.619       
   (0.114)  (0.232)  (0.550)       
Prefabricated Material  0.00941  0.413**  ‐0.102       
   (0.305)  (0.201)  (0.472)       
Bamboo, Cane, Another Plant  0.0235  ‐0.270  ‐7.142***       
   (0.232)  (0.690)  (0.333)       
Zinc, Cloth, Cardboard, Disposable Materials  0.428  ‐0.132  0.649**       
   (0.311)  (0.165)  (0.321)       
Floor Materials (Parquet, Marble omitted)             
Carpet  0.0824  ‐0.272  0.346  0.108  0.325 
   (0.234)  (0.683)  (0.498)  (0.464)  (0.494) 
Vinyl, Tiles, Bricks  0.755  0.0542  ‐0.187  ‐0.202  0.176 
   (0.527)  (0.279)  (0.638)  (0.949)  (0.530) 
Coarse Wood, Other Plant  0.601***  ‐0.322  ‐0.0789  ‐0.526  0.269 
   (0.131)  (0.237)  (0.431)  (0.586)  (0.419) 
Cement  0.148  ‐0.579*  0.702  ‐0.395  ‐0.588 
   (0.133)  (0.329)  (0.553)  (0.875)  (0.394) 
Dirt  0.191*  ‐0.491**  ‐0.300  ‐1.018    
   (0.103)  (0.223)  (0.501)  (0.832)    
Type of Toilet (toilet connected to sewerage omitted)  
Toilet connected to septic tank  0.0516  ‐0.786  ‐0.0638  ‐1.738***    
   (0.181)  (0.628)  (0.367)  (0.473)    
Disconnected toilet  ‐0.0895  ‐0.620  ‐0.697       
   (0.185)  (0.612)  (0.433)       
Latrine  0.169  ‐1.200*          
   (0.269)  (0.666)          
Low tide  ‐0.120  ‐1.818**  1.432       
   (0.294)  (0.859)  (1.013)       47 
 
   Stratum 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5 & 6) 
No toilet  ‐0.101  ‐1.166*          
   (0.197)  (0.657)          
Housing Utilities                
Natural gas  ‐0.111  ‐0.0988  0.0446  0.126  0.0211 
   (0.0986)  (0.0897)  (0.138)  (0.323)  (0.282) 
Aqueduct  ‐0.0402  ‐0.0377  0.541  ‐0.999    
   (0.101)  (0.296)  (0.494)  (1.084)    
Sewerage  0.0862  0.920  0.839**       
   (0.169)  (0.623)  (0.360)       
Rubbish collection  0.116*  0.0805  0.0917  0.0635  0.274** 
   (0.0622)  (0.0532)  (0.0723)  (0.276)  (0.124) 
Nearby risk locations                
Factories and industries, Market places or 
slaughterhouses  ‐0.0514  0.0324  0.162  0.351  0.523 
   (0.180)  (0.137)  (0.196)  (0.442)  (0.477) 
Landfill  0.122  0.0337  ‐0.367*  ‐0.594  ‐0.0756 
   (0.133)  (0.256)  (0.206)  (0.548)  (0.445) 
Airports  0.507  ‐0.376*  ‐0.150  0.253    
   (0.373)  (0.203)  (0.328)  (1.137)    
Bus terminals  ‐0.187  0.207  ‐0.270  0.925    
   (0.219)  (0.266)  (0.198)  (1.680)    
Sewage Pipes  0.0182  0.0372  0.155  ‐0.0965  0.817* 
   (0.102)  (0.121)  (0.248)  (0.222)  (0.430) 
Oil Transport  ‐0.167  ‐0.328*  ‐0.106  ‐0.899    
   (0.167)  (0.197)  (0.287)  (0.855)    
High tension power  ‐0.117  0.311  0.373  0.213  0.158 
   (0.105)  (0.190)  (0.253)  (0.508)  (0.309) 
Household Head's Characteristics                
Gender  ‐0.0965  0.0225  0.204*  0.614*  0.276 
   (0.0772)  (0.0914)  (0.110)  (0.351)  (0.207) 
Marital Status (Cohabitation is omitted)                
Married  ‐0.00714  0.191*  ‐0.0135  0.181  0.262 
   (0.0823)  (0.106)  (0.207)  (0.421)  (0.319) 
Widowed  0.0306  0.118  0.116  0.308  1.034** 
   (0.110)  (0.135)  (0.267)  (0.635)  (0.425) 
Divorced  ‐0.170  0.169  ‐0.151  0.593  0.0756 
   (0.121)  (0.132)  (0.254)  (0.724)  (0.413) 
Single  0.000837 0.253**  0.175  0.0434  0.330 
   (0.0969)  (0.115)  (0.206)  (0.575)  (0.340) 
Education (None/preschool is omitted)                
Primary (1 ‐ 5)  0.210**  0.268*  ‐0.191       
   (0.0907)  (0.159)  (0.249)       
Secondary (6 ‐ 13)  0.391***  0.344*  ‐0.0394  ‐0.183  ‐0.650 
   (0.112)  (0.192)  (0.253)  (0.304)  (0.495) 
Tertiary (univ/technical)  0.706***  0.426*  ‐0.260  ‐0.0378  ‐0.555 
   (0.177)  (0.248)  (0.272)  (0.215)  (0.451) 
Graduate  0.0962  0.785***  0.0976  0.00535  ‐0.550 
   (0.994)  (0.228)  (0.330)  (0.462)  (0.439) 
Age  0.00453*  0.00221  0.00154  0.00858  ‐0.00104 
   (0.00268) (0.00343) (0.00520)  (0.00805)  (0.00497)
Region Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                 48 
 
   Stratum 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5 & 6) 
Constant  14.83***  15.60***  12.94***  21.10***  14.18***
   (1.054)  (1.478)  (1.778)  (4.043)  (3.325) 
                 
Observations  2408  2401  837  181  122 
R‐squared  0.261  0.115  0.151  0.190  0.408 
Standard errors in parentheses.                 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                
 




VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5 & 6) 
                 
Formal  ‐0.0183  0.209  0.221       
   (0.117)  (0.177)  (0.302)       
Urban  0.0986  0.146**  0.515***  0.891***    
   (0.0727)  (0.0567)  (0.120)  (0.257)    
# of Bedrooms  0.0685*** 0.110***  0.119***  0.109***  0.146 
   (0.0249)  (0.0158)  (0.0171)  (0.0238)  (0.0968) 
Type of Unit (house is omitted)                
Apartment  0.193***  0.0765**  ‐0.0184  0.0154  ‐0.279 
   (0.0531)  (0.0303)  (0.0458)  (0.105)  (0.336) 
Room(s) in tenancy  ‐0.243**  ‐0.0360  ‐0.359***       
   (0.121)  (0.0771)  (0.105)       
Room(s) in other structure  ‐0.269  0.0105  ‐0.545***  ‐0.498**  ‐0.480 
   (0.182)  (0.100)  (0.113)  (0.202)  (0.619) 
Other (tent, wagon, boat, shelter, bridge)  0.918***  0.798***          
   (0.280)  (0.191)          
Wall Materials (bricks omitted)                
Adobe  ‐0.390*** ‐0.176  0.0135  ‐0.484    
   (0.141)  (0.152)  (0.116)  (0.352)    
Wattle  ‐0.280**  ‐0.176  0.170       
   (0.119)  (0.108)  (0.546)       
Wattle and Daub  ‐0.00372  ‐0.266  ‐0.659***       
   (0.197)  (0.277)  (0.0952)       
Coarse Wood  ‐0.104  ‐0.00968  ‐0.169**  ‐0.511**    
   (0.131)  (0.163)  (0.0836)  (0.222)    
Prefabricated Material  0.342***  ‐0.141  ‐0.827***       
   (0.113)  (0.150)  (0.145)       
Bamboo, Cane, Another Plant  ‐0.420**  0.660***  ‐0.264**       
   (0.179)  (0.158)  (0.112)       
Zinc, Cloth, Cardboard, Disposable Materials  ‐1.020  ‐0.404          
   (0.658)  (0.284)          
Floor Materials (Parquet, Marble omitted)                
Carpet  0.584  0.309  ‐0.112  0.327  0.259 
   (0.396)  (0.225)  (0.157)  (0.216)  (0.468) 
Vinyl, Tiles, Bricks  0.632**  0.694***  ‐0.164  0.109  0.779* 
   (0.311)  (0.219)  (0.238)  (0.214)  (0.395) 
Coarse Wood, Other Plant  0.623***  0.495**  ‐0.214**  0.00140  ‐0.108 
   (0.133)  (0.198)  (0.0926)  (0.120)  (0.347) 
Cement  0.349*  0.170  ‐0.313**  ‐0.159    
   (0.183)  (0.255)  (0.125)  (0.161)    
Dirt  0.317***  0.282  ‐0.373***  ‐0.602    
   (0.121)  (0.198)  (0.117)  (0.411)    
Type of Toilet (toilet connected to sewerage 
omitted) 
Toilet connected to septic tank  ‐0.0862  0.0344  ‐0.139  ‐1.043***  ‐1.855 
   (0.239)  (0.153)  (0.221)  (0.313)  (2.108) 
Disconnected toilet  ‐0.183  0.238  ‐0.0142       
   (0.224)  (0.160)  (0.269)       
Latrine  ‐0.282  0.0650          
   (0.241)  (0.214)          
Low tide  ‐0.397  0.115          50 
 
   Stratum 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5 & 6) 
   (0.269)  (0.188)          
No toilet  ‐0.107  0.265     0.0106    
   (0.254)  (0.348)     (0.133)    
Housing Utilities                
Natural gas  ‐0.172*** ‐0.160*** ‐0.172***  ‐0.0219  ‐0.313 
   (0.0573)  (0.0350)  (0.0406)  (0.0724)  (0.288) 
Aqueduct  ‐0.102  0.0864  0.213  ‐0.324**  2.336 
   (0.0833)  (0.153)  (0.135)  (0.143)  (1.878) 
Sewerage  ‐0.0145  ‐0.260  ‐0.0938  0.169    
   (0.232)  (0.164)  (0.251)  (0.285)    
Rubbish collection  0.0741*  0.0524**  0.0619***  0.0742***  ‐0.548 
   (0.0383)  (0.0246)  (0.0163)  (0.0266)  (0.390) 
Nearby risk locations                
Factories and industries  0.0238  ‐0.104**  ‐0.0232  ‐0.0105    
   (0.0734)  (0.0467)  (0.0513)  (0.126)    
Landfill  0.0690  0.172**  ‐0.150       
   (0.116)  (0.0701)  (0.114)       
Airports  ‐0.0372  ‐0.113  ‐0.000425  ‐0.0716  ‐0.304 
   (0.137)  (0.0849)  (0.172)  (0.107)  (0.519) 
Bus terminals  ‐0.376*** 0.0598  ‐0.206**  0.224*  ‐4.164 
   (0.125)  (0.0508)  (0.0806)  (0.120)  (2.644) 
Sewage Pipes  ‐0.0807  0.0142  ‐0.0735  ‐0.174    
   (0.0760)  (0.0425)  (0.0561)  (0.138)    
Oil Transport  ‐0.187  0.102  0.0734  ‐0.180    
   (0.155)  (0.119)  (0.134)  (0.192)    
High tension power  0.0944  0.0335  0.122**  ‐0.0524    
   (0.136)  (0.0517)  (0.0535)  (0.123)    
Household Head's Characteristics                
Gender  ‐0.0342  0.0164  0.155***  ‐0.000120  0.319 
   (0.0573)  (0.0443)  (0.0512)  (0.104)  (0.295) 
Marital Status (Cohabitation is omitted)                
Married  ‐0.0181  0.0793**  ‐0.0419  0.139  ‐0.121 
   (0.0632)  (0.0327)  (0.0529)  (0.114)  (0.663) 
Widowed  ‐0.115  0.0249  0.114  0.0458  0.761 
   (0.101)  (0.0984)  (0.0888)  (0.224)  (0.813) 
Divorced  ‐0.0718  ‐0.0625  0.0137  0.118  ‐0.290 
   (0.0748)  (0.0570)  (0.0632)  (0.149)  (0.937) 
Single  ‐0.192**  ‐0.0361  ‐0.0191  0.0913  0.0924 
   (0.0766)  (0.0614)  (0.0628)  (0.151)  (0.894) 
Education (None/preschool is omitted)                
Primary (1 ‐ 5)  0.00717  0.158*  0.127  ‐0.113  0.772 
   (0.0890)  (0.0820)  (0.232)  (0.304)  (0.653) 
Secondary (6 ‐ 13)  0.0690  0.227***  0.133  ‐0.128    
   (0.0913)  (0.0807)  (0.235)  (0.304)    
Tertiary (univ/technical)  0.242**  0.295***  0.264  0.0994  0.901* 
   (0.108)  (0.0856)  (0.236)  (0.306)  (0.466) 
Graduate  0.385***  0.379***  0.390  0.149  1.185 
   (0.139)  (0.127)  (0.251)  (0.295)  (0.719) 
Age  0.00366*  0.00159  0.00261  0.00336  0.00798 
   (0.00207)  (0.00127) (0.00172)  (0.00269)  (0.0109) 
Region Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  11.98***  10.53***  10.74***  12.15***  20.12***51 
 
   Stratum 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5 & 6) 
   (0.664)  (0.550)  (0.686)  (0.865)  (4.528) 
                 
Observations  796  1441  715  123  35 
R‐squared  0.531  0.398  0.365  0.779  0.905 
Standard errors in parentheses.                 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                
 